The proposal, often referred to as Section 219, would go far beyond agreements with Washington’s closest allies

By Andrew M. Leonard, reposted from Responsible Statecraft, October 19, 2026

Many of the areas of prescribed integration are highly sensitive, presenting significant counterintelligence risk. Sharing and embedding U.S. cyber, AI, and autonomous system developments with a foreign partner before the U.S. has even fully developed sufficient and adequate regulatory provisions to govern the use of this technology puts the U.S. under an unnecessary influence of a foreign partner. Additionally, if U.S. systems are dependent on foreign technology, that foreign partner gains leverage over the U.S., and at a time when the U.S. needs to be more clear-eyed on its own priorities, not those of other nations.

If such cooperation as outlined above was regular business, perhaps some of the arguments could be debated more reasonably. But, it is not ‘business as usual.’ In fact, Section 219 would legislate a relationship distinct and more powerful than others in existence today, even with the U.S.’s closest allies, like the Five Eye partners and NATO. Section 219 creates a multi-generational technological relationship with one partner that would be very difficult to rollback once incorporated into U.S. development and acquisition systems. It is a pure political maneuver with great risk to the U.S.; it is not necessary and is, in fact, dangerous.

At this point, to protect sensitive U.S. technological development and to ensure congressional oversight is not further abdicated, the House should make clear it won’t vote for an NDAA that comes out of conference if it includes this provision, and the Senate should remove or amend its corresponding Section 1217 from the FY27 NDAA and enter into a separate debate over the issue.